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SPEECH: A DIFFERENT LOOK AT COMPLIANCE IN
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: WHY THE NFL
PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY MIGHT BE
MORE ILLEGAL THAN THE VERY
CONDUCT IT SEEKS TO REGULATE
Marc Edelman*
Editors' Note: Marc Edelman is a member of the faculty at Barry Uni-
versity's Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law in Orlando, FL, where he
teaches in the areas of Antitrust, Contracts, Property and Sports Law.
He also teaches Law and Professional Sports during the summers at
Fordham Law School in New York, NY.
Professor Edelman has written numerous articles applying federal anti-
trust laws to the professional sports industry. In 2009, Professor
Edelman published the provocative article, "Are Commissioner Sus-
pensions Any Different from Illegal Group Boycotts?"' This article
was among the first to suggest that the NFL's Personal Conduct Policy
might violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Professor Edelman was the final speaker at the DePaul Journal of
Sports Law & Contemporary Problems March 4, 2011 symposium, en-
titled "A Rule is a Rule: Compliance in the World of Sports." With his
permission, it is our privilege to publish an edited transcript of his
speech. The Journal wishes to thank Professor Marc Edelman for ex-
tending us this opportunity to share his lecture with you.
INTRODUcrION
Thus far today, many of our panelists have discussed the problem of
collegiate and professional athletes not complying with league rules.
In this context, we have been speaking in a discourse that places a
duty of "compliance" on athletes to follow rules that are decided upon
* Marc Edelman is a member of the faculty at Barry University's Dwayne 0. Andreas School
of Law in Orlando, Florida (Marc@MarcEdelman.com). Professor Edelman earned his B.S. in
economics from the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania) and both his J.D. and M.A.
from the University of Michigan. He teaches sports law during the summers at Fordham Law
School in New York, NY. Professor Edelman retains full copyright to this article.
1. See Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really any Different from Illegal Group
Boycotts? Analyzing the Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW RiviEw 631 (2009).
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by either the leaders of the NCAA or professional sports leagues.
These rules, to the extent enforceable, come from contracts negotiated
between colleges or member-clubs in professional sports leagues.
These rules are not derived through collective bargaining. Thus, play-
ers do not have any say in the rules.
Today, I am going to speak almost exclusively about the NFL Per-
sonal Conduct Policy, and why the NFL Personal Conduct Policy, in
itself, might be illegal, much like some of the behavior it seeks to regu-
late. We will begin today with a discussion of the NFL Personal Con-
duct Policy. We will then turn to the underlying economic harms
caused by the policy. Finally, we will finish up with a brief discussion
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and why, by enforcing the NFL Per-
sonal Conduct Policy, the NFL team-owners themselves might be out
of compliance with U.S. federal law.
THE NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY
There is a lot of confusion about the NFL Personal Conduct Policy,
and how this policy came into place. To try to avoid this confusion, let
me first explain that the NFL Personal Conduct Policy was never a
product of arms-length collective bargaining between the NFL teams
and their players union, nor was it ever ratified, in writing, by the
players union. Rather, the early forms of the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy were unilaterally implemented by NFL team-owners to give the
league commissioner power to suspend players, on a limited basis, for
actual criminal wrongdoing. This makes the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy, in a legal sense, different from the NFL's substance abuse pol-
icy, which was collectively bargained and appears directly in the
league's CBA ("collective bargaining agreement").2
Also, to turn back many years to when the NFL teams first imple-
mented their personal conduct policy, the NFL Personal Conduct Pol-
icy was, at the time, really no big deal. This was because the last
commissioner of the NFL, Paul Tagliabue-a lawyer and a former
partner at the law firm of Covington and Burling-used the policy and
its suspension power only to suspend players for the most serious of
conduct, and only for one game or two games at a time, at most.
Then, in 2007, the NFL teams hired a new commissioner, Roger
Goodell, and with the NFL teams' approval, Goodell announced a far
more extensive version of the Personal Conduct Policy. The new pol-
icy was drastically broader than the old policy. In it, each of the indi-
vidual NFL teams granted the commissioner power to suspend players
2. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, Art. XLIV, § 6 (Substance Abuse).
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for a wide range of conduct, including even conduct where there had
been no finding of criminal wrongdoing. In addition, the new Per-
sonal Conduct Policy empowered the NFL commissioner to suspend a
player for an indefinite period of time, which in essence could mean
their termination from the league for life. Perhaps because Goodell,
unlike Tagliabue, had no formal legal training, he missed the point of
how thirty-two independent teams granting one man the power to
keep a player from practicing his profession might be deemed to be an
illegal group boycott under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. To the ex-
tent the NFL's lawyers noticed the problem, they never made their
concerns public.
As [Marquette Law] Professor [Matthew] Parlow alluded to earlier
on this panel, the NFL Personal Conduct Policy was not a complete
blindside to the union. Before announcing changes to the policy,
Commissioner Goodell discussed these changes with the former head
of the National Football League Players Association, the late Gene
Upshaw, as well with a panel of anywhere from five to ten players-
the exact amount has been disputed in the media. But the NFL play-
ers union never agreed in writing to inserting this policy into the CBA,
and the CBA, at the time, specifically had a clause that says no
changes to the CBA are permissible, unless in a signed writing.3
So, in essence, the NFL Personal Conduct Policy was put in place by
the teams-maybe with the union's tacit approval, certainly with a few
players' approval-but not in the scope of collective bargaining.
Thus, the policy is not by any stretch exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
ECONOMIC HARMS OF THE NFL CONDUCT POLICY
Now, some of you may be saying "so what's the big deal?" Employ-
ers generally govern the conduct of their employees, and the NFL
Personal Conduct Policy is no different than any other form of work-
place oversight. Many of you might also appreciate the policy because
you think it enforces good public values. Dog-fighting, late night phi-
landering and carrying guns without a license are all wrongful acts.
Shouldn't we applaud the NFL from keeping negative role models off
television?
However, to try to make the point about why the NFL Personal
Conduct Policy is different from a traditional employer implementing
a code of decorum for its employees, let's try something.
Raise your hand if you would have a problem if your home law
school, DePaul Law School, implemented a policy that said if profes-
3. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, Art. LV, § 19 (Parol Evidence).
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sors were found to engage in dog-fighting, they would be terminated.
Would anyone here have a problem with that? No hands.
What about my home law school? What if Barry University put in
place a rule that said if a professor engaged in dog-fighting they would
be fired? Does anybody have a problem with that? Again, there are
no hands.
Now, let me add a twist. What about if every law school in the
country, through the American Bar Association, agreed not to hire
any law professor that ever engaged in dog-fighting? Thus, under this
hypothetical, any professor who ever engaged in dog-fighting would
be prohibited from teaching law-even after he served time, paid off
his debt to society, and is rehabilitated?
Now, finally, I see some hands.
I think you get the point.
Here's why the NFL Personal Conduct Policy is different from
traditional workplace rules. The NFL is not a single employer.
Rather, it is a collection of thirty-two separate businesses. If you do
not believe me, just read the Supreme Court's recent 9-0 opinion in
American Needle, which says just that.4 So, when the NFL bans a
worker, it is not like DePaul Law School banning a worker or Barry
Law School banning a worker, but more like all the law schools in the
country together banning a worker.
Making matters even worse, in the United States, the NFL's thirty-
two teams are the only collection of businesses that play premier pro-
fessional football. Of course, there is the recently formed UFL, but
that is on a much lower level and far lower pay scale. So UFL not-
withstanding, if you are a premier professional football player in the
United States, the only places where you could go work is for one of
the thirty-two NFL teams. Thus, if the thirty-two NFL teams all got
together and passed a rule that said we're going to exclude a particu-
lar player, then that particular player is no longer able to practice his
profession in a meaningful way anywhere in the U.S., or perhaps even
anywhere in the world.
Also, just to clarify, while we are saying that it is the commissioner
who announces suspensions, a commissioner suspension is really no
different than thirty-two teams collectively agreeing to a suspension.
Think about who the NFL commissioner is. The NFL commissioner is
not some independent actor. The NFL commissioner is hired by the
4. American Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2206-07 (May 24, 2010) (not-
ing that "the NFL's licensing activities constitute concerted action that is not categorically be-
yond the coverage of [Section 1 of the Sherman Act]. The legality of that concerted action must
be judged under the Rule of Reason.").
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thirty-two separate NFL teams to act as a quasi-agent or perhaps a
fiduciary on their behalf. So when the commissioner says someone is
indefinitely suspended from the NFL, it in essence is as if the teams
have all gotten together and reached an agreement to keep someone
out of the league and restrain the person's right to practice the
profession.
In addition, when Commissioner Goodell suspends a player, what
he and the NFL teams are really doing is reducing consumers' ability
to express a preference to see a brand of professional football that
contains the players who are being boycotted under the policy.
Let me illustrate that last point a bit further. We're here in Chi-
cago. How many Bears fans do we have in the room? (Many hands
rise). That is a decent number of Bears fans.
During the past couple of years when the Bears were struggling,
who would have been okay if Michael Vick became their
quarterback? (Many hands rise again).
That is a lot of hands.
Now, in a free market, absent the restraint known as the NFL Per-
sonal Conduct Policy, if your hands translated into an increased will-
ingness to pay for tickets for the Bears games if Vick were the
quarterback, and not Rex Grossman, Bears ownership may have
signed Michael Vick the moment that the Atlanta Falcons released
him.
However, the NFL Personal Conduct Policy disregards the free
market preferences of consumers by saying that no NFL team-owner
may sign certain players-no matter how badly local fans are willing
to pay for this event. Thus, the policy deprives consumers of the tradi-
tional means to exercise product preference.
WHY THE NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY MAY VIOLATE
ANTITRUST LAW
For the past several minutes, I have been secretly interweaving anti-
trust law into our discussion of public policy. But, for a moment, let's
look at the black letter law and see how specifically the NFL Personal
Policy might be illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
As some of you may know, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in perti-
nent part, states that "[e]very contract, combination .. . or conspiracy,
in the restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal."5
This section of antitrust law, of course, does not literally mean that
every business contract is illegal. However, Section 1 of the Sherman
5. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. H§ 1-7 (2000).
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Act outlaws many types of agreements to fix prices, fix wages, allocate
markets, and boycott third parties.6
There is a three-step process for determining whether particular
conduct violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act. First, the court will
determine whether the arrangement constitutes an agreement among
two or more parties that affects interstate commerce.7 Then, the court
will determine whether the arrangement, on balance, enhances or sup-
presses competition." Finally, the court will determine whether any
affirmative defense negates the finding of antitrust liability.9
Let's begin with the two threshold issues: interstate commerce and
an agreement among parties. We all know that the NFL engages in
interstate commerce: nobody is disputing that. Television is broadcast
across state lines. Internet features are broadcast across state lines.
The players move across state lines. The games take place across state
lines.
In addition, the Supreme Court has now told us in its American
Needle opinion that, in an antitrust sense, the NFL is composed of
thirty-two separate parties and is not a single entity.10 So that thresh-
old issue, which we discussed briefly before, is also met.
As to the second part of the antitrust analysis-whether the NFL
personal conduct policy is unreasonable under the antitrust meaning
of that word-up until the late 1970s the rule of reason allowed courts
to play the role of policy advocates. During that period, courts bal-
anced what was economically harmful in a restraint with what it
deemed to be the restraint's full range of economic and social justifi-
cations. Thus, this prong of rule of reason analysis was once as ob-
scure as guessing what lies inside a black box.
Under the old set of rules, we saw this type of wide-open balancing
test in a case that [Toledo Law School professor Geoffrey] Rapp ear-
6. See Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and 'Free Movement' Risks of Expanding Pro-
fessional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 Nw. J. INr'r L. & Bus. 403, 412-13 (2009).
7. See Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133,1147 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Section 1,
like the tango, requires multiplicity. A company cannot conspire with itself."); see also Denver
Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cal. 1971) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1); Marc Edelman, Are
Commissioner Suspensions Really any Different from Illegal Group Boycotts? Analyzing
Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58 CA-'I i. U. L. R,v. 631
(2009).
8. See Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really any Different from Illegal Group
Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58
CATI. U. L. Ruv. 631, 640-41 (2009).
9. See Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really any Different from Illegal Group
Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58
CATI. U. L. Ri-v. 631, 640-41 (2009).
10. American Needle Inc., 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2206-07.
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lier referenced, Molinas v. National Basketball Association." In that
case from 1961, the Southern District of New York upheld an indefi-
nite suspension of Jack Molinas for being engaged in gambling on bas-
ketball games, finding that, on balance, the moral harms of gambling
outweighed the anti-competitive effect of the group boycott.
However, the old anything-matters view of the Rule of Reason is
long gone. In an important Supreme Court case from the late 1970s,
United States v. National Society of Professional Engineers,12 the Court
made the broad line of reasoning in Molinas obsolete. According to
the Supreme Court's decision in Professional Engineers, a proper as-
sessment of conduct under the Rule of Reason must focus solely on
balancing the competitive conditions of a restraint, both good and
bad.13 In fact, the Supreme Court in Professional Engineers said even
important public policy concerns such as safety could not save a re-
straint that, in an economic sense, was not anticompetitive.
Now, my understanding of what Professional Engineers means is
that today the NFL cannot defend its personal conduct policy on mo-
rality, and can only try to defend it by arguing that the policy is eco-
nomically beneficial to consumers. So maybe a gambling case such as
Molinas would come out the same way today if a court were able to
show that a player gambling on his sport would lead consumers to lose
trust for the sport, and thus the sport would cease to exist due to a loss
of fans.
But if you take the Professional Engineers standard and apply it to
the NFL personal conduct policy, I strongly doubt that one could ear-
nestly come to the same conclusion. Although we may not like dog-
fighters in the NFL because we think dog-fighters like Michael Vick
are immoral and bad role models, those are not pro-competitive eco-
nomic reasons for keeping dog-fighters out. They are simply public
policy arguments.
Now, that doesn't mean any single team on its own could not reach
the independent business conclusion and announce, "We are not sign-
ing Michael Vick." And if all thirty-two teams reach that same con-
clusion, independently based on their own business judgment, there is
no antitrust violation at all. But when the commissioner steps in and
reaches that decision on behalf of all thirty-two teams together, the
commissioner takes the power away from the individual teams and the
consumers, and that is exactly where the antitrust problem lies.
11. 190 F.Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
12. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
13. Nat'1 Soc'y of Prof'1 Engineers, 435 U.S. at 688.
2011]1 95
96 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 7:89
WHAT CAN THE NFL Do LEGALLY TO STAMP OUT
BAD BEHAVIOR?
Even for those concerned about the personal conduct of NFL play-
ers, there are, of course, other ways to protect decorum without en-
forcing a potentially illegal, personal conduct policy. First, as I
mentioned earlier, any individual NFL team already may impose its
own, independent code of conduct without running afoul of antitrust
law. I would presume that certain conduct is so egregious that no
NFL team would ever sign a player that engages in that conduct, even
absent a league-wide policy.
In addition, if a player engages in grossly illegal conduct, that player
will likely be incarcerated and thus unable to play football anyway.
We do not really need to worry about a player that has committed a
string of murders seeking to join the NFL. That player would be in
jail, thanks to our publicly operated criminal justice system.
If the NFL Players decide not to maintain a union, perhaps the NFL
teams could go to Congress and get permission to get an exemption
from antitrust law subject to federal oversight.
Or, finally, to the extent the NFL Players decide to maintain a
union, the NFL teams may attempt to collectively bargain over the
NFL Personal Conduct Policy. Of course, if the teams and the players
can reach an agreement in writing over the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy, the entire argument that the policy violates antitrust law be-
comes moot, as many courts already have ruled that bona-fide collec-
tively bargained agreements related to mandatory terms and
conditions of bargaining are exempt from antitrust law1 4 and chal-
lengeable only against the union under labor law.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I wanted to remind all of you that overall I agree with
most of the panelists on a number of points, including the importance
of promoting positive football role models. Nevertheless, the method
by which NFL club owners have sought to promote positive role mod-
els is improper.
The NFL Personal Conduct Policy harms the players that Commis-
sioner Goodell suspends by concertedly taking away their right to
practice their profession. In addition, the NFL Personal Conduct pol-
14. For example, the Supreme Court of the United States has crafted a "non-statutory" labor
exemption to antitrust scrutiny where employer conduct relates to the collective bargaining pro-
cess. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996).
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icy harms consumers by robbing them of their ability to demand, on
the free market, football games that include those excluded players.
I am not, by any means, condoning the egregious wrongs committed
in recent years by Michael Vick, Ben Roethlisberger, and several
other NFL players. However, for the NFL team-owners to use the
egregious wrongful acts of a few NFL players as a carte blanche li-
cense to engage in a group boycott is a gross miscarriage of justice.
Two wrongs do not make a right.
Thus, if the NFL club owners truly want to encourage NFL players
to act with greater decorum, they, like the players, must follow the
black letter of the law. This begins with implementing a policy of per-
sonal conduct that itself complies with the law, and specifically Section
1 of the Sherman Act.
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